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Abstract 
Thematic relations are an important source of perceived similarity. For instance, the rowing 
theme of boats and oars increases their perceived similarity. The mechanism of this effect, 
however, has not been specified previously. We investigated whether thematic relations 
affect similarity by increasing commonalities or by decreasing differences. In Experiment 1, 
thematic relations affected similarity more than difference, thereby producing a non-inversion 
of similarity and difference. Experiment 2 revealed substantial individual variability in the 
preference for thematic relations and, consequently in the non-inversion of ratings. In sum, 
the experiments demonstrated a non-inversion of similarity and difference that was caused by 
thematic relations and exhibited primarily by a subgroup of participants. These results 
indicate that thematic relations affect perceived similarity by increasing the contribution of 
commonalities rather than by decreasing the contribution of differences. 
 
KEYWORDS: difference; similarity; structural alignment; thematic integration; thematic 
relations.   3 
Similarity is fundamental to cognition and to some extent has been implicated in 
nearly every cognitive process from perceptual classification to economic decision-making. 
For example, recall of an item set is influenced by both perceptual (Conrad, 1964) and 
semantic similarity (Deese, 1959) as well as by the similarity between conditions at encoding 
and conditions at retrieval (Godden & Baddeley, 1975); categorization depends on an item’s 
similarity to a prototype (Rosch, 1973) or to a set of exemplars (Medin & Schaffer, 1978); the 
course of spreading activation in a semantic network reflects the similarity between nodes 
(Meyer & Schvanenveldt, 1971); the success of analogical transfer is influenced by the 
similarity between the source and target problem (Gick & Holyoak, 1980); and inductive 
reasoning is often guided by the similarity between possible solutions and instances stored in 
memory (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). So, given its ubiquity, it is crucial to determine what 
factors influence the perception of similarity. 
In general, perceived similarity is determined by direct comparison (Tversky, 1977). 
This is the case for just about any pair of stimuli, from simple concepts (Markman & 
Gentner, 1993) to complex scenes (Markman & Gentner, 1996). However, perceived 
similarity is also influenced by thematic relations, which arise when two stimuli participate in 
a common scenario. For example, milk is generally rated more similar to cow than to horse 
(Wisniewski & Bassok, 1999), presumably because of the thematic relation between milk and 
cow. Currently, the mechanism of this thematic influence remains unspecified. Similarity 
judgments are based on commonalties and differences. Do thematic relations influence 
similarity by increasing the contribution of commonalities, or by decreasing the contribution 
of differences? In this article we report two experiments that utilize difference ratings as a 
diagnostic tool for discriminating between these explanations. 
Comparison and Similarity   4 
Perceived similarity is largely based on the commonalities and differences between 
stimuli (Tversky, 1977). The structural alignment model (Gentner & Markman, 1994, 1997; 
Markman, 1996; Markman & Gentner, 1993) specifies how these commonalities and 
differences are determined, combined, and weighted during similarity judgments. The model 
assumes structured representations consisting of predicates that take one or more arguments. 
For example, assume that rose and violet are represented respectively as and [scent 
(SWEET), petal color (RED)] and and [scent (SWEET), petal color (BLUE)]. Aligning 
stimulus representations can yield three main types of output. A matching predicate and 
matching attribute (e.g., scent: SWEET) indicate a commonality, whereas a matching 
predicate and mismatching attribute (e.g., petal color: RED, BLUE) reveal an alignable 
difference. Finally, some predicates have no corresponding arguments in the comparison 
stimulus (e.g., roses have thorns, violets do not); these constitute a nonalignable difference. 
The model further assumes that alignable differences are conceptually linked to 
commonalities. Indeed, the number of commonalities is positively correlated with the number 
of alignable differences, but is negatively correlated with the number of nonalignable 
differences (Markman & Gentner, 1993). For example, although a rose has more 
commonalities with a violet than with a violin, roses also have more alignable differences 
with a violet than with a violin. Roses and violins, in contrast, have more nonalignable 
differences (Markman & Wisniewski, 1997). So as a consequence of structural alignment, 
commonalities and alignable differences tend to be more salient than nonalignable 
differences (Gentner & Markman, 1997; for exceptions see Estes & Hasson, 2004). 
The predicate (argument) representational structure is flexible enough to represent not 
just attributes (e.g., SWEET, BLUE), but also the relationship between attributes. For 
instance, the relation between a flower’s stem and its petals could be represented as support 
(STEM, PETALS). In fact such structural relations, which link two arguments together, are   5 
more salient than common attributes (Markman & Gentner, 2000). To illustrate, Medin, 
Goldstone, and Gentner (1990) presented base stimuli along with alternatives that matched 
the base in terms of either an attribute or a relation, and participants chose which alternative 
was more similar to the base. To provide a simplified example, participants judged base 
stimuli such as □-□ to be more similar to a relation match such as ○-○ than to an attribute 
match such as □-○. Apparently, the common structural relation (i.e., a repeated object) was 
more salient than the common attribute (i.e., a square). Thus, the structural alignment model 
favors higher-order relations and preferentially weights matches at the most abstract level 
(Markman & Gentner, 2000). 
In summary, the structural alignment model specifies how the analogous predicates 
and arguments are put into correspondence, and which of these are relevant for perceived 
similarity. The model implicitly describes two stages of similarity judgment. An alignment 
stage reveals the commonalities and differences between stimuli, and subsequently an 
assessment stage weights these commonalities and differences to arrive at a perception of 
similarity. Moreover, much research on perceived similarity indicates that commonalities are 
weighted more heavily than differences, that structural relations are more salient than 
attributes, and that alignable differences are more salient than nonalignable differences 
(Gentner & Markman, 1994, 1997; Markman & Gentner, 1993, 2000).  
Thematic Relations and Similarity 
Thematic relations arise from the co-occurrence or interaction of stimuli via some 
common scenario (cf. Lin & Murphy, 2001, p. 3). To illustrate, boats are related to oars via a 
rowing theme, doctors are related to nurses via a hospital theme, and money is related to a 
receipt via a purchasing theme. Unlike structural relations, which occur between the attributes 
of a single stimulus, thematic relations occur between two different stimuli. Thematic 
relations are central to understanding actions and events because these are usually organized   6 
according to theme (Bower, Black, & Turner, 1979; Schank & Abelson, 1977). 
Consequently, thematic relations affect language comprehension (Estes & Jones, 2009), 
conceptual combination (Estes, 2003a; Estes & Jones, 2006; Gagne & Shoben, 1997; 
Wisniewski, 1997), and memory (Jones, Estes, & Marsh, 2008). Thematic relations also 
influence categorization, sorting, naming, and induction (Lin & Murphy, 2001; Murphy, 
2001). For instance, in an elegant series of experiments, Lin and Murphy demonstrated that a 
base concept (e.g., dog) was frequently grouped with a thematic option (e.g., bone) rather 
than a taxonomic option (e.g., cat).  
Thematic relations also affect perceived similarity. Using complex semantic stimuli, 
Bassok and Medin (1997) discovered that many participants justified their similarity 
judgments of sentence pairs by thematically relating them. For example, when justifying the 
similarity between “The carpenter fixed the chair” and “The carpenter sat on the chair”, one 
participant wrote “Similar because he sat on the chair to see whether he fixed it well.” Bassok 
and Medin (1997) argued that thematic integration predominates when comparison is not 
easy, as with nonalignable items. Because the above sentence stimuli lack a shared relational 
structure (i.e., they describe different events), comparison is difficult and this conflict triggers 
integration. By this account, comparison is the primary process for determining similarity, 
but integration is an important secondary process for certain types of items.  
Using simpler stimuli, Wisniewski and Bassok (1999) demonstrated that thematically 
related concepts such as milk and cow are judged more similar than unrelated concepts like 
milk and horse. Wisniewski and Bassok also found that thematic relations influenced 
participants’ justifications of their similarity judgments. While participants tended to compare 
alignable stimuli (e.g., “both are used to travel across water” for ship / canoe), they typically 
integrated stimuli that were thematically related (e.g., “a mechanic works on cars” for car / 
mechanic). Wisniewski and Bassok (1999) proposed that stimulus compatibility with   7 
comparison or thematic integration drives process selection. Because alignable concepts 
share features and structural relations they are readily comparable. Nonalignable concepts, 
which lack such commonalities, are more compatible with thematic integration. For instance, 
participants frequently cited implausible thematic relations between nonalignable concepts 
that were also unrelated (e.g., “an electrician doesn’t repair chairs” for chair / electrician). 
Thus, lack of shared conceptual structure can trigger integration even in the absence of a 
preexisting thematic relation. However, thematic relations also affected participants’ 
similarity ratings when the stimuli could be easily aligned and compared (e.g., milk / coffee). 
These stimulus factors interact with (but are not eliminated by) task factors, such as judging 
similarity versus thematic relatedness.  
Finally, Estes (2003b) showed that the same concepts are judged more similar when 
they are integrated. For instance, table and vase were rated more similar by participants who 
first integrated the concepts as a table vase than by participants who simply rated their 
similarity without integrating them. Jones and Love (2007) also found that concepts were 
judged more similar when they were presented in the same thematic sentence than when 
presented in thematically unrelated sentences.   
The influence of thematic integration on perceived similarity is now well documented, 
but the mechanism by which it does so is currently unknown. Because this uncertainty has 
potential consequences for any cognitive model pertaining to similarity, it is important to 
specify how thematic relations impinge upon similarity judgments. The above explanations 
concerning stimulus compatibility (Wisnkiewski & Bassok, 1999) and integration as a 
secondary process that occurs when the stimuli are incompatible with alignment (Bassok & 
Medin, 1997) both provide useful descriptive frameworks of the thematic effect. However, 
the present research goes a step further by considering possible mechanisms of this thematic 
effect on similarity. Because perceived similarity is computed across commonalities and   8 
differences, we will consider whether thematic relations influence perceived similarity via 
commonalities or via differences.  
Let us first consider how thematic relations might influence commonalities. One 
possibility is that a thematic relation is expressed as a commonality during judgment. For 
example, when comparing sailors and ships, noticing the thematic relation between them (i.e., 
sailors sail ships) might lead one to induce a commonality – namely that both sailors and 
ships participate in SAILING. Construed in this way, the thematic relation would go on to 
influence similarity just like any other commonality. Thus, the thematic relation might 
increase the total number of commonalties between sailors and ships. And given that the 
addition of commonalities increases perceived similarity (Gati & Tversky, 1984), this would 
explain the thematic effect on similarity ratings. Another possibility is that thematic relations 
simply increase the weighting accorded commonalities. So rather than acting as a 
commonality itself, the “participates in SAILING” relation might emphasize other extant 
commonalities of sailors and ships, such as their common location. To be clear, the present 
experiments will not distinguish between these number-of-commonalities and weighting-of-
commonalities explanations. The important point for present purposes is that by either 
account, thematic relations increase perceived similarity by increasing the contribution of 
commonalities. We refer to this explanation as the commonality hypothesis.  
Alternatively, thematic relations could decrease either the number of differences that 
are detected during alignment or the weighting of differences during assessment (again, 
however, these explanations will not be distinguished empirically). For example, the 
“participates in SAILING” relation either could inhibit the detection of differences such as 
the differing material substances of sailors (i.e., flesh and bone) and ships (i.e., wood and 
metal), or it could more generally suppress the weighting of the differences that are detected. 
And because decreasing the difference between concepts increases their perceived similarity   9 
(even though commonalities receive more weight than differences during similarity 
judgments; Tversky, 1977), thematic integration would increase perceived similarity. Thus, 
thematic relations may increase similarity by decreasing the contribution of differences 
during judgment. We therefore refer to this as the difference hypothesis. 
Some evidence already points to a thematic disruption of difference perception.  
Gentner and Gunn (2001) had participants list either thematic relations or commonalities 
between concept pairs such as tree / child, and subsequently asked those participants to list a 
difference between concept pairs. Critically, the difference listing task included both old pairs 
that had been integrated (relation listing) or compared (commonality listing) in the first stage 
and new pairs that were not previously seen. Gentner and Gunn found that participants who 
initially listed commonalities later identified more differences for old pairs, whereas 
participants who initially listed thematic relations later identified more differences for new 
pairs. The fact that participants in the thematic group actually showed poorer difference 
listing for old items than for new suggests an influence of thematic integration on difference 
perception; if thematic relations had no influence, then participants should have listed 
approximately the same number of differences for old and new items. Although this result 
offers some support for the difference hypothesis, it is important to note that exactly how 
impaired difference perception would influence similarity judgments depends on whether 
these differences were predominantly alignable or nonalignable, which is not reported.  
In summary, the commonality hypothesis explains the thematic effect as an increase 
in similarity, whereas the difference hypothesis explains the thematic effect as a decrease in 
difference. Because both hypotheses predict that thematically related items will be judged 
more similar than unrelated items, distinguishing between these explanations will depend on 
understanding how thematic relations influence perceived difference. 
Difference   10 
Early models treated difference and similarity as complementary (Gregson, 1975, p. 
8). In fact, spatial models of similarity (e.g., multidimensional scaling) were often based on 
discriminability measures, which are inherently difference based. As early as Hollingworth 
(1913, cited in Gregson, 1975), however, there was evidence that difference is not the mirror 
image of similarity. Most famously, Tversky (1977) demonstrated an inconsistency between 
similarity and difference using pairs of countries that were either well known (e.g., USA and 
USSR) or less well known (e.g., Ceylon and Nepal) by the experimental participants. The 
familiar countries had more features in common and were consequently judged to be more 
similar to one another than the unfamiliar countries. However, the familiar countries also had 
more distinctive features and therefore were also judged to be more different than the 
unfamiliar countries. Tversky concluded that common features are accorded more weight in 
perceived similarity, whereas distinctive features are accorded more weight in perceived 
difference. This difference in the relative importance of common and distinctive features can 
lead to a non-inversion between similarity and difference judgments. The result is that more 
similar concepts are not always correspondingly less different. 
  Structural alignment provides a more specific account of difference judgments. As 
described earlier, structural alignment emphasizes structural relations and alignable 
differences. The model predicts that structural relations are more heavily weighted in 
similarity judgments, whereas alignable differences are more heavily weighted in difference 
judgments (Markman, 1996). Therefore, stimuli with structural relations in common and with 
salient alignable differences should be judged high in both similarity and difference. For 
example, Medin et al. (1990) found that a base stimulus (e.g., □-□) was judged both more 
similar to and more different from a relation match (e.g., ○-○) than an attribute match (e.g., 
□-○). Markman (1996) argued that the relation match was chosen as more similar because it 
shared a structural relation with the base (i.e., repeated shape), and was chosen as more   11 
different because it had more alignable differences from the base (i.e., two circles rather than 
one circle). Thus, structural alignment contends that the outputs of the comparison process 
(e.g., structural relations, alignable differences) are weighted differently across judgments. 
Estes and Hasson (2004) replicated this non-inversion with other geometric stimuli, and 
Bassok and Medin (1997) obtained the effect with sentential stimuli. In all three of those 
studies, the non-inversion was caused by a differential influence of structural relations on 
perceived similarity and difference.
1  
  In addition to structural relations, thematic relations also affect difference judgments. 
As described previously, Gentner and Gunn (2001) found that listing a thematic relation 
between concepts decreased the likelihood that participants subsequently would list a 
difference between those concepts. Moreover, we have demonstrated elsewhere (Simmons 
and Estes, 2008) that thematic relations can induce a non-inversion of similarity and 
difference. We showed that a base concept (e.g., dog) was often judged both more similar to 
and more different from a thematic alternative (e.g., bone) than a taxonomic alternative (e.g., 
cat). In fact, the commonality hypothesis and the difference hypothesis both predict that 
thematic relations will induce a non-inversion between similarity and difference. Critically, 
though, the hypotheses make opposing predictions regarding the direction of this presumed 
non-inversion. Consider the thematically related concept pair coffee / milk and the 
thematically unrelated pair coffee / lemonade. Coffee should be judged more similar to milk 
than to lemonade because the thematic relation between milk and coffee either increases their 
commonalities (commonality hypothesis) or decreases their differences (difference 
hypothesis). So let’s assume that the similarity ratings, on an increasing scale from 1 to 7, are 
5 for coffee / milk and 4 for coffee / lemonade. More informative are the difference judgments 
of these stimuli. The commonality hypothesis predicts that thematic relations will have a 
smaller influence on difference judgments, because commonalities receive less weight in   12 
difference than in similarity (Markman, 1996; Tversky, 1977). Their difference ratings, again 
on an increasing scale from 1 to 7, might both be 4. That is, the thematic relation between 
milk and coffee should increase their similarity but should have little or no effect on their 
difference. In contrast, the difference hypothesis predicts that thematic relations will have a 
larger influence on difference judgments, because differences receive more weight in 
difference judgments than in similarity judgments (Markman, 1996; Tversky, 1977). Given 
similarity ratings of 5 and 4 for coffee / milk and coffee / lemonade, their difference ratings 
should be more like 2 and 4. That is, the thematic relation between milk and coffee should 
increase their similarity slightly, but should decrease their difference more dramatically. 
To recap, the commonality hypothesis predicts that thematic relations will have a 
smaller influence on difference judgments. That is, the thematic relation between milk and 
coffee should increase their similarity but should have little or no effect on their difference. In 
contrast, the difference hypothesis predicts that thematic relations will have a larger 
influence on difference judgments. That is, the thematic relation between milk and coffee 
should increase their similarity slightly, but should decrease their difference more 
dramatically. Thus, the non-inversion of similarity and difference can be used as a diagnostic 
tool to discriminate between the commonality hypothesis and the difference hypothesis. The 
present experiments therefore investigated the role of thematic relations in similarity and 
difference.  
Experiment 1 
In Experiment 1 participants rated either the similarity or the difference of stimulus 
pairs for which alignability and thematic relatedness were orthogonally crossed. That is, 
following Wisniewski and Bassok (1999), the stimuli were alignable and thematically related 
(A+T+; milk & coffee), alignable and unrelated (A+T-; milk & lemonade), nonalignable and 
related (A-T+; milk & cow), or nonalignable and unrelated (A-T-; milk & horse). Alignability   13 
was included as a factor both to make our design more comparable to Wisniewski and 
Bassok’s (1999) and to increase the generality of our results. The experiment thus had a 2 
(Alignability) × 2 (Thematic Relatedness) × 2 (Judgment) mixed design, with judgment 
(similarity, difference) manipulated between-participants. If thematic relations differentially 
affect perceived similarity and perceived difference, then Thematic Relatedness should 
interact with Judgment. More specifically, a larger effect of Thematic Relatedness in 
similarity judgments than in difference judgments would support the commonality 
hypothesis. The opposite pattern, a smaller thematic effect in perceived similarity than in 
perceived difference, would instead support the difference hypothesis. 
Method 
Participants. Participants in both of the experiments reported below were 
undergraduates at the University of Georgia, all were native English speakers, and all 
received partial course credit for participation. Sixty undergraduates participated in 
Experiment 1. 
Materials. Stimuli were sampled from Wisniewski and Bassok (1999). Each of twelve 
base concepts was paired with one target concept in each cell of the 2 (Alignability) x 2 
(Thematic Relatedness) factorial, thus yielding 48 stimulus pairs. All alignable pairs were 
members of the same taxonomic category. Category membership is a good proxy for 
alignability because category co-members tend to share many alignable differences, which 
indicates structural similarity (Markman & Wisniewski, 1997). All thematic pairs shared a 
functional relationship. For example, the base concept “milk” was paired with “coffee” 
(A+T+), “lemonade” (A+T-), “cow” (A-T+), and “horse” (A+T-). For a complete list of 
stimuli, see Table 1. 
Procedure. Participants were randomly assigned to either a Similarity condition or a 
Difference condition. In both conditions, all 48 stimulus pairs appeared in a pseudo-random   14 
order with the restriction that pairs containing the same base did not appear consecutively. 
Each trial began with a stimulus pair presented in the center of the display. After 1800 ms, 
participants in the Similarity condition were asked “On a scale of 1 (not at all similar) to 7 
(extremely similar) how similar are [base] and [target]?” This prompt appeared beneath the 
stimulus pair and remained onscreen until a response was entered by key press. The 
Difference condition was procedurally identical, except that all instances of the word 
“similar” were replaced with “different”. 
  Data analysis. In both of the experiments reported below, data were analyzed 
according to the same statistical procedures. In order to facilitate comparison with the 
similarity ratings, the difference ratings were reverse scored in all analyses, figures, and 
tables. To control for incidental differences between the similarity and difference scales, 
ratings were transformed to standard (z) scores separately for similarity and difference 
judgments prior to analysis; raw scores are reported in the figures and tables to maximize 
interpretability. Data were analyzed via separate ANOVAs, one with participants random 
(Fp) and another with items random (Fi). Alignability and Relatedness were analyzed within-
participants and between-items, whereas Judgment was between-participants and within-
items. Across experiments, all effects or interactions not reported were not significant by both 
participant and item analyses. 
Results 
To summarize, a non-inversion was obtained, with a larger thematic effect in 
similarity than difference. This effect was more pronounced with alignable items. Thus, 
thematic integration caused a non-inversion that was moderated by alignability. Means and 
standard errors are reported in Table 2. A 2 (Alignability) x 2 (Thematic Relatedness) x 2 
(Judgment) ANOVA indicated significant main effects of both alignability [Fp (1, 58) = 
183.36, p < .001; Fi (1, 44) = 135.75, p < .001] and thematic relatedness [Fp (1, 58) = 48.33, p   15 
< .001; Fi (1, 44) = 25.25, p < .001]. Alignable items were judged to be more similar and less 
different than nonalignable items, and thematically related items were judged more similar 
and less different than unrelated items. Alignability accounted for the majority of the variance 
in similarity (ηp
2 = .70) and difference (ηp
2 = .81). Importantly, thematic relations accounted 
for more variance in similarity (ηp
2 = .54) than in difference (ηp
2 = .34). These effects were 
qualified by two significant interactions, which are illustrated in Figure 1.  
Figure 1 shows the magnitude of the thematic effect – that is, the difference in ratings 
for thematically related items minus thematically unrelated items. Higher values indicate a 
larger effect of thematic relatedness. Two main results are apparent. First, alignability and 
thematic relatedness interacted [Fp (1, 58) = 81.62, p < .001; Fi (1, 44) = 9.94, p < .01], 
indicating that the influence of thematic relations was larger for nonalignable items than for 
alignable items (see Figure 1). More importantly, thematic relatedness also interacted with 
judgment [Fp (1, 58) = 5.05, p < .05; Fi (1, 44) = 26.74, p < .001]. As shown in the figure, 
thematic relations affected similarity ratings (white bars) more than difference ratings (gray 
bars). We subsequently conducted 2 (Thematic Relatedness) x 2 (Judgment) ANOVAs for 
the alignable conditions (A+T+, A+T-) and for the nonalignable conditions (A-T+, A-T-) 
separately.  
Alignable Conditions. For alignable items (e.g., milk & coffee; milk & lemonade), 
thematic relations increased perceived similarity but did not decrease perceived difference, 
thereby causing a non-inversion. The main effect of judgment was reliable by items [Fi (1, 
22) = 5.53, p <.05] but not by participants [Fp (1, 58) = .65, p = .46]. This was qualified by an 
interaction between judgment and thematic relatedness [Fp (1, 58) = 6.89, p < .01; Fi (1, 22) = 
11.53, p <.01]. Paired comparisons confirmed that thematic relations significantly increased 
similarity [Fp (1, 29) = 13.66, p < .01; Fi (1, 22) = 4.47, p < .05] but exerted no effect on 
difference (both p > .75). This non-inversion between similarity and difference is apparent in   16 
left half of Figure 1. While the difference in ratings for related and unrelated items is 
substantial for similarity judgments (white bar), it is almost non-existent for difference (gray 
bar). That is, milk was judged more similar to coffee than to lemonade, but milk was not 
judged any less different from coffee than from lemonade. Perhaps the simplest illustration of 
this non-inversion is the discrepant effect sizes for similarity and difference. While thematic 
relations accounted for nearly a third of the variance in similarity judgments (ηp
2 = .32), they 
accounted for almost no variance in difference judgments (ηp
2 < .01).  
Nonalignable Conditions. For nonalignable items (e.g., milk & cow; milk & horse), 
thematic relations increased similarity and decreased difference. However, the effect of 
thematic relatedness was larger for similarity than for difference. Once again, the main effect 
of judgment was reliable by items [Fi (1, 22) = 8.43, p <.01] but not by participants [Fp (1, 
58) = .52, p = .47]. The main effect of thematic relatedness was significant in both analyses 
[Fp (1, 58) = 75.06, p < .001; Fi (1, 22) = 38.88, p <.001]. The interaction was marginally 
significant [Fp (1, 58) = 2.85, p = .09; Fi (1, 22) = 16.19, p < .01], but paired comparison 
indicated that thematic relations both increased similarity [Fp (1, 29) = 44.09, p < .001; Fi (1, 
22) = 37.00, p < .001] and decreased difference [Fp (1, 29) = 31.00, p < .001; Fi (1, 22) = 
37.00, p < .001]. The right half of Figure 1 illustrates that the effect of thematic relations was 
substantial for both similarity (white bar) and difference (gray bar). So unlike the alignable 
condition, here, thematic relations influenced both similarity and difference ratings. However, 
like the alignable condition, the thematic influence on nonalignable items was larger in 
similarity (η
2 = .60) than in difference (η
2= .52). 
Discussion 
The results of Experiment 1 support the commonality hypothesis. Thematic relations 
did induce a non-inversion of similarity and difference, and this effect was larger for 
similarity than for difference. For instance, milk was rated more similar to coffee than to   17 
lemonade. This thematic effect in similarity could be due to thematic relations either 
inhibiting differences (i.e., the difference hypothesis) or increasing commonalities (i.e., the 
commonality hypothesis). If it were due to difference inhibition, then that thematic relation 
should decrease difference even more than it increases similarity, since differences are 
weighted more heavily in difference judgments than in similarity judgments (Markman, 
1996; Tversky, 1977). Alternatively, if it were due to increasing commonalities, then that 
thematic relation should decrease difference less than it increases similarity, since 
commonalities are weighted more heavily in similarity judgments than in difference 
judgments. In actuality, milk was rated equally different from coffee and lemonade. Thus, 
because thematic relations influenced similarity more than difference, the results supported 
the commonality hypothesis.  
A secondary result was that thematic relations had a larger influence on judgments of 
nonalignable stimuli than of alignable stimuli. This replicates Wisniewski and Bassok’s 
(1999) finding that alignable stimuli induce comparison whereas nonalignable stimuli induce 
integration. That is, thematic relations have a larger effect on nonalignable stimuli, since 
those items are more compatible with integration.  
Experiment 2 
  Some evidence points to substantial variation among individuals in the size of the 
thematic effect on similarity and difference (Simmons & Estes, 2008). In a previous project 
we presented base concepts (e.g. dog) with a taxonomically related option (e.g. cat) and a 
thematically related option (e.g. bone), and instructed participants to choose the option that is 
more similar to the base. We found that some participants clearly preferred taxonomic 
options, while others clearly preferred thematic options (see also Gentner & Brem, 1999; Lin 
& Murphy, 2000; Murphy, 2001; Waxman & Namy, 1997). Such individual variability in 
participants’ use of thematic information was also present in the current Experiment 1. For   18 
instance nearly a third of participants (30%) typically assigned A-T+  items  (e.g., milk / cow) 
a rating less than two, whereas nearly a fourth (23%) typically assigned these items a rating 
greater than five.  
These results suggest that the commonality hypothesis may explain the behavior of 
some participants but not others. If this is the case, then the non-inversion between similarity 
and difference observed in Experiment 1 would be found in the ratings of a subset of 
participants, only. The triad task just described provides a useful way to identify how strongly 
participants’ judgments are influenced by thematic relations. In Experiment 2 we tested the 
generality of the commonality hypothesis, by administering the triad task prior to the 
similarity / difference rating task. Firstly, we examined whether participants’ choices on the 
triad task predicted their performance on the subsequent rating task. Secondly, we examined 
whether non-inversion in the ratings task is exhibited by most participants, or whether the 
effect is limited to participants with a strong thematic preference (as evidenced by the triad 
task). Participants who almost always select the thematic option as more similar to the base in 
the triad task should show a large effect of thematic relatedness in the ratings task and a non-
inversion between similarity and difference. Participants who almost never select the 
thematic option in the triad task should show little or no effect of thematic relatedness in the 
ratings task and complementary similarity and difference judgments. 
Method 
  One hundred thirty-two undergraduates participated. As in Experiment 1, participants 
rated the similarity / difference of the 48 items originally used in Wisniewski & Bassok 
(1999). This main experiment was preceded by a triad task, using thirty triads sampled from 
Lin & Murphy (2001). Each triad consisted of a centrally presented target word above two 
response options. One option was thematically related to the target and the other was 
taxonomically related. For example, the target word “pencil” had “pen” (taxonomic match)   19 
and “eraser” (thematic match) as response options. See Table 3 for a complete list of triad 
stimuli. Participants were instructed to choose the option “that is most similar to the target 
word” by pressing “1” or “2” on the number pad (Simmons & Estes, 2008). On half the trials 
“1” corresponded to a thematic match and on the other half “1” corresponded to an attribute 
match. The triads were presented in random order. Following the triad task, all participants 
completed either the similarity or the difference rating task described in Experiment 1.  
Results 
Triad Choice Task 
As a measure of performance in the triad task, we calculated for each participant the 
proportion of trials on which the thematic option was chosen (henceforth “thematic 
proportion”). Across all participants, the thematic proportion ranged from 0.00 to 1.00. The 
mean was .64 (SD = .40) and the median was .87, thus indicating that participants tended to 
choose the thematic alternative as more similar to the target. Moreover, the distribution was 
extremely polarized; most participants exhibited a clear preference either for taxonomic 
matches or for thematic matches (see also Lin & Murphy, 2001; Murphy, 2001). For 
example, while 32% of participants selected the thematic match on 30% or less of trials, 58% 
selected the thematic match on 70% or more of trials. Only 10% of participants exhibited no 
clear preference for taxonomic or thematic choices. Thus, striking individual differences in 
similarity judgment were observed (see also Simmons & Estes, 2008). We used these 
individual differences to predict the non-inversion in the subsequent rating task.  
Regression Analyses 
First we examined the relationship between thematic proportion and non-inversion 
across all participants via regression analysis. As a general measure of the effect of thematic 
relatedness, we took the difference in ratings between the related and unrelated conditions 
(henceforth “relatedness effect”). That is, for each participant, the mean of the unrelated   20 
conditions (A+T- and A-T-) was subtracted from the mean of the related conditions (A+T+ 
and A-T+). Next, we tested whether participants’ thematic proportion (from the triad task) 
predicted their relatedness effect (from the rating task). Indeed, thematic proportion 
significantly predicted the relatedness effect in both similarity ratings [R
2 = .39, F (1, 65) = 
40.87, p < .001] and difference ratings [R
2 = .10, F (1, 63) = 7.15, p = .01]. Finally, to test 
whether thematic proportion predicted the relatedness effect significantly better in the 
similarity ratings than in the difference ratings, we used participants’ thematic proportion to 
predict the interaction between the relatedness effect and judgment type via linear regression. 
The model fit was reliable [F (1, 130) = 31.70, p < .001; R
2 = .20, β = .44], thus indicating 
that thematic proportion better predicted the relatedness effect in similarity than in difference. 
Participants who tended to choose the thematic alternative in the triad task also tended to 
exhibit a relatively large influence of thematic relations in the similarity rating task. But 
performance on the triad task was less predictive of the effect of relatedness in the difference 
rating task.  
Group-wise Analyses 
We also examined the relationship between thematic proportion and non-inversion via 
analyses of variance. In this analysis we treated thematic proportion as a categorical variable, 
thereby creating one group of participants who exhibited a strong preference for the 
taxonomic alternative (i.e., the “attribute group”) and another group who strongly preferred 
the thematic alternative (i.e., the “relation group”). Of all participants in the similarity rating 
condition, the 20 who exhibited the lowest thematic proportion were selected for the attribute 
group, and the 20 who exhibited the highest thematic proportion were selected for the relation 
group. The same process was used to select attribute participants and relation participants 
from the difference rating condition. The mean thematic proportion was .08 (SE = .01) for the 
attribute group and was .98 (SE = .01) for the relation group. An initial 2 (Group: attribute,   21 
relation) x 2 (Alignability) x 2 (Thematic Relatedness) x 2 (Judgment) ANOVA revealed that 
the Group factor exhibited several significant three-way and two-way interactions with other 
factors. Overall, the results replicated the findings of Experiment 1. There was a main effect 
of Alignability [Fp (1, 76) = 413.21, p < .001; Fi (1, 44) = 227.58, p < .001] and of Thematic 
Relatedness [Fp (1, 76) = 76.87, p < .001; Fi (1, 44) = 30.73, p < .001] as well as a significant 
interaction between these factors [Fp (1, 76) = 92.98, p < .001; Fi (1, 44) = 11.75, p < .001]. 
The Thematic Relatedness by Group interaction was marginal in the participant analysis and 
significant by items [Fp (1, 76) = 3.52, p = .07; Fi (1, 44) = 15.27, p < .001], indicating a trend 
towards greater influence of thematic relations on similarity than on difference. Most 
importantly, the three-way interaction between Group, Thematic Relatedness, and Judgment 
was significant [Fp (1, 76) = 5.75, p < .05; Fi (1, 44) = 35.86, p < .001]. Thus, for simplicity, 
the attribute and relation groups are considered in separate analyses below (see Table 2).  
Attribute group. Participants who tended to select the attribute match in the triad task 
showed little effect of thematic relatedness on similarity ratings (see Figure 2A). In the 
Judgment x Alignability x Thematic Relatedness analysis, the main effect of alignability was 
significant [Fp (1, 38) = 349.67, p < .001; Fi (1, 44) = 381.11, p < .001], accounting for most 
of the variance in similarity (ηp
2 = .95) and difference (ηp
2 = .85). Contrary to the results of 
the previous experiment, thematic relations accounted for relatively little variance in either 
similarity (ηp
2 = .11) or difference (ηp
2 = .20). This main effect of thematic relatedness was 
only significant by participants [Fp (1, 38) = 6.96, p < .05; Fi (1, 44) = 2.74, p = .11]. 
However, thematic relatedness and alignability significantly interacted [Fp (1, 38) = 42.37, p 
< .001; Fi (1, 44) = 6.24, p = .02]. We therefore analyzed the alignable and the nonalignable 
items separately. 
For the alignable items, thematic relations had no influence on similarity or 
difference. Neither main effect was significant, nor was their interaction. This is apparent in   22 
the left half of Figure 2A, where the thematic effect is negative and close to zero. That is, if 
anything, these participants gave slightly higher similarity ratings to A+T- items than to 
A+T+ items. For the nonalignable items, only the main effect of thematic relatedness was 
significant in both analyses [Fp (1, 38) = 19.07, p < .001; Fi (1, 22) = 30.17, p < .001]. The 
lack of interaction indicates that thematic relations affected similarity (ηp
2 = .27) and 
difference (ηp
2 = .39) approximately equally. Thus, for these participants, thematic relations 
only affected similarity and difference for nonalignable stimuli.  
Relation group. Participants who preferred the thematic option in the triad task 
showed a markedly different pattern of results (see Figure 2B). Although alignability still 
accounted for a large proportion of the variance in similarity (ηp
2 = .55) and difference (ηp
2 = 
.83), thematic relations accounted for a comparable proportion of rating variance in similarity 
(ηp
2 = .77). Consistent with Experiment 1, thematic relations accounted for less variance in 
difference judgments (ηp
2 = .51). Thematic participants clearly exhibited a non-inversion in 
the alignable conditions. In the Judgment x Alignability x Thematic Relatedness analysis, 
each of the two-way interactions was significant (all p < .05). Thus, the alignable and the 
nonalignable items are examined separately below. 
For the alignable items, thematic relations increased perceived similarity but not 
perceived difference (see the left half of Figure 2B). This interaction was significant [Fp (1, 
38) = 11.43, p < .01; Fi (1, 22) = 14.32, p < .01]. Paired comparisons confirmed that thematic 
relatedness affected similarity [Fp (1, 19) = 26.68, p < .001; Fi (1, 22) = 14.31, p < .01] but 
not difference (both p > .05). The left half of Figure 2B clearly illustrates this differential 
influence of thematic relations on similarity (ηp
2 = .58) and difference (ηp
2 = .18); the white 
bar, indicating the thematic effect on similarity, is clearly higher than the gray bar, indicating 
the thematic effect on difference. For the nonalignable stimuli, the main effect of thematic 
relatedness was significant [Fp (1, 38) = 84.70, p < .001; Fi (1, 22) = 58.57, p < .001], and   23 
there was mixed evidence for an interaction between thematic relatedness and judgment [Fp 
(1, 38) = 2.42, p = .13; Fi (1, 22) = 21.78, p < .001]. Thus, thematic relations clearly 
influenced similarity and difference, though this influence was larger for similarity (white 
bars, ηp
2 = .80) than for difference (gray bars, ηp
2 = .55). Consequently the non-inversion was 
observed. 
Discussion 
Prior to the similarity/difference rating task, participants were presented a series of 
base concepts (e.g., dog) and were asked to choose whether a taxonomic option (e.g., cat) or a 
thematic option (e.g., bone) was more similar to that base. A regression analysis indicated 
that participants’ choices on the triad task reliably predicted their performance on the 
subsequent rating task. More interestingly, however, participants’ triad choices better 
predicted their similarity ratings than their difference ratings. We also examined the 
generality of the commonality hypothesis by comparing one group of participants who rarely 
chose the thematic option against another group who almost always chose the thematic option 
in the triad task. The extent of the thematic effect and, consequently, of non-inversion was 
much greater in the relation group than the attribute group. The discrepancy between these 
groups was most pronounced with alignable stimuli, where the attribute group exhibited no 
thematic effect and no non-inversion, whereas the relation group exhibited a strong thematic 
effect on similarity and a large non-inversion. This individual variability means that the 
commonality hypothesis advanced in Experiment 1 explains the behavior of the large subset 
of participants for whom thematic relations are salient, but does not characterize the 
responses of participants who ignore thematic relations in similarity and difference.  
It is possible that another mechanism is responsible for the small thematic effect 
found in the attribute participants’ judgments of nonalignable items. Preliminary support for 
this idea comes from Simmons and Estes (2008), who found that thematic preference in the   24 
triad task was independently predicted by two factors – an explicit belief that thematic 
relations are relevant to similarity and low need for cognition (Caccioppo & Petty, 1982). 
Thus, the commonality hypothesis might apply only to participants who believe that thematic 
relations are a legitimate source of similarity, while another mechanism might underlie the 
judgments of low NFC thematic participants. Although additional research is needed to 
clarify this issue, collectively, these results provide the strongest evidence to date that 
thematic relations cause a non-inversion of similarity and difference. 
General Discussion 
The experiments reported here were motivated by two converging lines of research. 
Some studies have demonstrated an effect of thematic integration on perceived similarity 
(Bassok & Medin, 1997; Estes, 2003b; Jones & Love, 2007; Wisniewski & Bassok, 1999), 
and others have indicated that certain types of information are weighted differently across 
similarity and difference judgments (Estes & Hasson, 2004; Medin et al., 1990; Simmons & 
Estes, 2008; Tversky, 1977). We utilized this non-inversion to elucidate the mechanism 
through which thematic relations influence similarity and difference judgments. In sum, the 
experiments demonstrated a non-inversion of similarity and difference that was caused by 
thematic relations and exhibited primarily by a subgroup of participants. Results suggest that 
thematic relations affect perceived similarity via commonalities, the relative influence of 
which varied not only across stimuli and tasks (see also Wisniewski & Bassok, 1999), but 
also across individuals (see also Simmons & Estes, 2008). We first review the empirical 
results in greater detail, and then we consider their theoretical implications for models of 
similarity and difference.  
Empirical Review    25 
Alignability. The largest and most consistent effect in these experiments was a main 
effect of Alignability. Stimuli that could be aligned easily (e.g., milk & coffee) were rated 
significantly more similar and less different than nonalignable stimuli (e.g., milk & cow).  
Thematic Relatedness. Both experiments also exhibited effects of Thematic 
Relatedness. Thematically related stimuli (e.g., milk & coffee) were rated reliably more 
similar and less different than unrelated stimuli (e.g., milk & lemonade).  
Judgment x Thematic Relatedness. The interaction between Judgment and Thematic 
Relatedness indicates a non-inversion of similarity and difference. To illustrate, in 
Experiment 1 milk was judged more similar to coffee than to lemonade. Furthermore, this 
effect was larger in similarity than in difference. In Experiment 2, the non-inversion was 
more pronounced among participants for whom thematic relations are particularly salient.  
Alignability x Thematic Relatedness. The interaction between Alignability and 
Thematic Relatedness, which was obtained in both experiments, indicates that thematic 
integration exerted a larger effect on nonalignable stimuli than on alignable stimuli. 
Nonalignable stimuli share few structural relations and have few alignable differences, and 
therefore participants’ judgments were largely affected by thematic relations. But because 
alignable stimuli are easily compared, the thematic influence is tempered (Wisniewski & 
Bassok, 1999). We also observed differential effects of stimulus alignability on the non-
inversion of similarity and difference; the non-inversion occurred primarily with alignable 
stimuli.  
Individual Variability. Some participants showed a greater effect of thematic relations 
on their ratings than other participants (cf. Lin & Murphy, 2001; Murphy, 2001; Simmons & 
Estes, 2008). Interestingly, one’s overall preference for thematic choices in a triad task 
strongly predicted one’s similarity ratings, but only weakly predicted one’s difference ratings. 
Furthermore, participants who tended to choose the thematic option in the triad task also   26 
tended to exhibit a large non-inversion of similarity and difference. Other participants, who 
tended to choose the taxonomic option in the triad task, exhibited no non-inversion for 
alignable items and an attenuated non-inversion for nonalignable items.  
Theoretical Implications 
The present experiments tested two potential mechanisms of this thematic influence. 
According to the difference hypothesis, thematic relations indirectly influence perceived 
similarity by decreasing difference (either by decreasing the number of differences detected 
or by decreasing the weighting of those differences). According to the commonality 
hypothesis, thematic relations influence similarity by increasing perceived commonalities. If 
thematic relations act via differences, then relations should have a larger effect on perceived 
difference than on perceived similarity, because differences are more important to difference 
than to similarity (Markman, 1996; Tversky, 1977). Or if thematic relations act via 
commonalities, then relations should have a larger effect on perceived similarity, because 
commonalities are more important to similarity than to difference. Results supported the 
commonality hypothesis: In Experiment 1 and a subset of Experiment 2 the effect of thematic 
relations was larger in similarity than in difference (Figures 1, 2B). In no case did thematic 
relations exert a significantly larger effect on perceived difference than on perceived 
similarity. 
Thematic relations contributed substantially to the perception of similarity in both 
experiments. Perhaps the strongest effect of thematic relations was observed in the Relation 
Group of Experiment 2 (Figure 2B). For those participants, thematic relatedness (ηp
2 = .77) 
was more important than alignability (ηp
2 = .55) for the perception of similarity. In fact, when 
alignability and thematic relatedness were pitted against one another, the thematically related 
stimuli (A-T+) were judged more similar than the alignable stimuli (A+T-). For example, 
those participants judged milk to be more similar to cow than to lemonade. Thus, the thematic   27 
effect was quite striking for some participants. At the same time, the Attribute Group 
exhibited virtually no thematic effect on either similarity or difference (Figure 2A).  
This research also provides the first demonstration of an effect of thematic relations 
on difference judgments, and contributes to the evidence for non-inversion that is caused by 
thematic relations (see also Simmons & Estes, 2008). In some respects, the thematic 
influence on difference was analogous to the thematic effect on similarity; thematically 
related items were generally judged to be less different than unrelated items. However, this 
effect was smaller in difference than in similarity, and it was particularly evident in ratings of 
alignable items. As with similarity judgments, the strength of the thematic effect varied 
between individuals. For example, for the attribute group in Experiment 2, thematic relations 
accounted for very little variance in difference ratings (ηp
2 = .04)), but for the relation group, 
thematic relations accounted for over half of the variance in difference ratings (ηp
2 = .58).  
The existence of such striking individual differences raises the important question of 
how prevalent the thematic effect is for similarity and difference. Stated alternatively, if 
thematic relations were shown to exert only a small effect on only a small minority of 
participants, then it might be more parsimonious to exclude them from models of similarity 
and difference. There are at least three reasons to reject this suggestion. First, both the 
absolute magnitude of the thematic effect and the proportion of variance explained by 
thematic relatedness were relatively large. Second, a large percentage of the participants in 
Experiment 2 exhibited a preference for thematic similarity choices. Indeed, we have found 
in other studies that this preference for thematic similarity choices is not only prevalent, but 
also highly robust (Simmons & Estes, 2008). Finally, even participants who strongly 
preferred taxonomic similarity choices (i.e., the Attribute Group of Experiment 2) 
nonetheless exhibited an effect of thematic relations with nonalignable stimuli. These 
findings collectively suggest that similarity and difference judgments are best predicted by   28 
taking thematic relations into account. Models of cognition pertaining to similarity may also 
benefit from considering the contribution of thematic relations. For example, categorization 
models that use only feature-based similarity may underestimate the probability of assigning 
thematically related concepts to the same category, and models of semantic priming fail to 
anticipate lexical priming from thematic integration (Estes & Jones, 2009).   
Like structural relations and attributes, thematic relations enrich one’s knowledge 
about the relationship between concepts. For example, in comparing ship / tugboat, 
recognizing that tugboats tow ships permits further inferences about tugboats, in general (e.g. 
although they are smaller than ships, tugboats must have powerful engines to perform their 
job). Because thematic relations provide specific knowledge about a particular scenario, they 
allow one to “plan future activities and understand current events” (Lin & Murphy, 2001 p 
23). Thus, people for whom thematic information is salient might make more or qualitatively 
different types of inferences than people who ignore thematic relations. This knowledge can 
then influence interactions with objects or aid in problem solving (e.g. if tugboats can tow 
ships they can be used to tow a variety of things). Given the consequences of a thematic 
effect on similarity, the present research endeavored to specify the mechanism underlying 
this influence. 
In summary, our results offer several insights into the mechanism and characteristics 
of the thematic effect on perceived similarity. First, thematic relations influence perceived 
similarity and difference by increasing the contribution of perceived commonalities between 
concepts. Secondly, like structural relations and attributes, thematic relations are more salient 
for similarity than for difference. Thirdly, thematic relations have less influence when there 
are many structural relations and attributes than when there are few such commonalities. 
Finally, the salience of thematic relations varies across participants (see also Simmons & 
Estes, 2008). Thus, the present results demonstrate that capturing similarity and difference   29 
judgments requires a quite flexible model; it must accommodate rather dramatic variability in 
the weighting of thematic relations across stimuli (alignable v. nonalignable), across 
judgments (similarity v. difference), and across participants (taxonomic v. thematic 
preferences). 
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Footnotes 
1. Obtaining a different result for similarity and difference judgments, in itself, would be 
unremarkable. After all, different questions and scales have unique response 
characteristics. But the structural alignment model predicts a differential influence of a 
specific type of information across judgments that, when present, can induce a non-
inversion. This is very different (and more interesting) than predicting an absolute non-
inversion, where similarity and difference judgments always differ. This latter non-
inversion simply could reflect scaling incompatibility rather than a deeper conceptual 
difference between judgments. For this reason, we will focus exclusively on non-inversion 
that arises because a type of information is more important to one judgment than to 
another.   35 
Table 1. Stimuli used in the rating tasks for experiments 1 and 2.                
        Match Type 
Base    A+T+    A+T-    A-T+    A-T- 
milk    coffee    lemonade  cow    horse 
ship    lifeboat  canoe    sailor    soldier 
car    tow truck  pickup truck  mechanic  plumber 
chair    table    bed    carpenter  electrician 
telephone  ans. machine  tape recorder  receptionist  waitress 
tie    suit    dress    man    woman 
chisel    hammer  screwdriver  sculpture  painting 
cat    mouse   hamster  veterinarian  pediatrician 
cup    kettle    pan    tea    wine 
fly    spider    beetle    screen   curtain 
peanut butter  jelly    cream cheese  knife    fork 
apple pie  ice cream  jello    baker    tailor 
Source: Wisniewski & Bassok (1999)    36 
Table 2. Similarity and reverse-scored difference ratings (M and SE) across experiments.  
Stimuli 
Experiment  Judgment     A+T+     A+T-      A-T+       A-T- 
1    Similarity  4.69 (.15)  4.08 (.19)  3.41 (.33)  1.71 (.14) 
    Difference  3.78 (.17)  3.74 (.19)  2.31 (.23)  1.31 (.07) 
2 – Attribute  Similarity  4.07 (.18)  4.25 (.18)  1.71 (.23)  1.27 (.10) 
Difference  4.18 (.07)  4.34 (.08)  2.00 (.19)  1.27 (.06) 
2 – Relation  Similarity  4.57 (.19)  3.34 (.19)  4.22 (.32)  1.69 (.10) 
    Difference  4.72 (.19)  4.46 (.19)  3.01 (.33)  1.40 (.11) 
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Table 3. Stimuli used in the triad task, Experiment 2.                
        Match Type 
Base      Taxonomic      Thematic 
cat      lion        litter box 
spider      wasp        spider web 
French fries    baked potato      ketchup 
panda bear    grizzly bear      bamboo 
chalk      marker       blackboard 
king      president      crown jewels 
organ      accordion      church 
Tortilla chips    potato chips      salsa 
pepperoni    pork chops      pizza 
bees      flies        honey 
camel      antelope      desert 
crib      water bed      baby 
police car    sedan        police officer 
pencil      pen        eraser 
Hollywood    Chicago      movie stars 
monastery    synagogue      monk 
can opener    bottle opener      can 
diamond ring    bracelet      engagement 
robbery    treason       bank 
beer      juice        party 
airplane    car        pilot 
swimming    golf        swimming suit 
Hawaii     Missouri      beach 
milk      soda        calcium 
saxophone    harp        jazz 
turkey     swan        Thanksgiving 
waitress    stewardess      restaurant 
igloo      cabin        Eskimo 
hot dog    steak        mustard 
Source: Lin & Murphy (2001)    38 
Figure 1. The thematic effect (Mrelated – Munrelated) as a function of Judgment (Similarity, 
Reverse-scored Difference) and Alignability, Experiment 1. 
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Figure 2. The thematic effect (Mrelated – Munrelated) as a function of Judgment (Similarity, 
Reverse-scored Difference) and Alignability, presented separately for the Attribute Group 
(panel A) and the Relation Group (panel B), Experiment 2. 
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